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Abstract
Many industrial sites in developing countries and emerging economies face increasing exposure to
environmental hazards, e.g. in coastal locations, while being situated within the territory of state
authorities which lack in capacity to provide adaptation solutions. It is therefore relevant to ask,
whether and how firms engage in adaptation, both individually and collectively, in order to reduce
business disruptions, enhance their competitiveness and shape regional development. However,
the literature has made little efforts to address these questions conceptually and empirically. The
paper therefore develops a heuristic conceptual framework for deciphering the decision-making
of firms exposed to environmental hazards and the role that they might play for shaping larger
risk governance and eventually regional adaptation. In doing so, the paper builds on both an
explorative empirical study in Jakarta and Semarang and the assessment of different literatures of
relevance to the topic. The proposed framework argues that firms potentially fulfill a twofold role
in shaping integrative adaptive regional development when exposed to environmental hazards.
First, firms seek to enhance their own competitiveness through adjustments which are deter-
mined by their routines, risk behavior and the institutional setting. Second, firms act as
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stakeholders within broader collective adaptation. In conclusion, the framework suggests that
firms’ (in-)actions can shift the trajectories of regional development into different directions,
along a gradient from collapse, resistance, resilience to transformation. The framework can be
used to guide empirical analysis and inspire policy making and practice of integrated adaptation
governance, especially in rapidly changing developing countries and emerging economies.
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Introduction
This paper addresses an important yet paradoxical gap in current scholarship:While firms are at
the frontline in terms of suffering loss and damage from disasters related to environmental
hazards (floods, storms, etc.), their capacity and willingness to engage in individual and/or
collective action for risk reduction is little understood. Gaining a better understanding of wheth-
er and how firms drive forward adaptation individually and contribute to collective adaptation
towards environmental hazards is of key importance for a number of reasons, we argue.
First, as the number and intensity of disasters related to environmental hazards is on the
rise globally, especially the economic losses from disasters are growing. Data from the
reinsurance industry suggest that the amount of economic losses has risen by about 36%
between the decades of 1997 to 2006 and 2007 to 2016 (Munich Re, 2017). The economic
impact is relatively high in many emerging economies such as Bangladesh, Vietnam or
Indonesia due to their high exposure of valuable assets (e.g. critical infrastructure at the
coastline) combined with high vulnerabilities and low protection levels. The average share of
economic losses to the respective GDP is about 1% in emerging economies (between 2001
and 2006) and 10 times higher than the average in developed countries (World Bank, 2012).
While these data mostly consider insured assets and losses in the formal economy, addi-
tional assessments suggest that the overall economic losses are even higher, when informal
economies are considered (Hallegatte et al., 2016; 2017). The latter are prevalent especially
in developing countries and emerging economies, i.e. lower and upper middle income coun-
tries according to the World Bank (2017) classification.
Second, with a further growth in the intensity and frequency of environmental hazards
expected in the future, driven by climate change and regional to local environmental deg-
radation (IPCC, 2014), the future economic losses from disasters can be expected to rise
further. Environmental hazards such as sea level rise and an increase in storm activities,
riverine flooding, heat spells and other hydro-meteorological hazards will present a great
challenge to the performance and eventually survival of many firms, especially those in
coastal or otherwise exposed areas and those with immovable or hard-to-change infrastruc-
ture, such as manufacturing firms.
Third, this to-be expected increase in future losses is further driven by the continued
development of economic infrastructure and productive assets (e.g. industrial zones) within
highly hazard-exposed urbanizing coastal zones (e.g. in and around harbor cities) or along
rivers (e.g. for transport and water supply as well as discharge purposes) (Jones and O’Neill,
2016; Seto et al., 2012).
Fourth, since states oftentimes face difficulties in identifying and enacting effective adap-
tation and risk reduction measures – especially in developing countries and emerging
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economies – they leave an adaptation vacuum in which firms need to cater for their own
adaptation or even drive collective adaptation strategies for entire regions.
Fifth, adaptation and risk reduction is typically a neglected – at least under-emphasized –
field in economic geography. There are therefore many open questions of how firms make
adaptation decisions, become actors in wider (regional) adaptation governance, balance
efforts for individual vs. collective adaptation and potentially become central actors in
wider (regional) adaptation governance, using their typically strong profiles in terms of
innovation, finance, expertise and social responsibility.
Against the background of these five intersecting aspects, we conducted an explorative field
study in Jakarta and Semarang demonstrating that firms mostly rely on individual adaptation
measures such as elevating the street level or the plant and establishing pump systems which
by far are not sufficient. When it comes to collective action, the firms seem to be trapped in a
social dilemma. Therefore, this paper sets out to provide a framework – called integrative
adaptive development (IARD) – that helps to guide future analysis and practice of firms as
adaptation actors in terms of both individual adaptation for securing their competitiveness
and collective adaptation for achieving adaptation of entire regions, i.e. spatial and functional
entities with shared hazard exposure and/or economic profile.
The paper is structured as follows: The second section outlines the consequences of
insufficient engagement of the state on adaptation. The third section presents our case
studies: the Indonesian cities Jakarta and Semarang and outlines challenges of manufactur-
ing firms and state authorities to adapt to floods. Based on these examples, we derive our
conceptual IARD-framework and explain that we assume a two-folded perspective on how
firms can drive adaptation and different outcomes of reconfigured pathways are possible.
The fourth section about the need of firms and regions to adapt to environmental hazards
decipher both perspectives, individual and collective adaptation through reviewing different
approaches. The explanation of the IARD-framework is followed by a brief outlook on
potential scenarios of the regional trajectories in the case studies Jakarta and Semarang.
The last section provides a conclusion and an outlook for further research.
The role of the state on risk reduction and adaptation
Risk reduction and adaptation are widely and to a large part considered to be within the
responsibility of states and lower tier formal public institutions. This is because tasks such as
large-scale hazard mapping and risk assessment as well as the provisioning of infrastructure
systems for early warning (e.g. through meteorological services), hazard protection (e.g.
through dyke systems), response (e.g. through disaster response units and the military) and
recovery (e.g. for emergency shelter) typically go beyond the capacity of individual agents
within a society and need state organs for their planning, implementation and maintenance,
following the logics of public goods and services (Aguirre, 2007; Williams, 2011; World Bank,
2010). At the same time, adaptation to environmental hazards becomes an increasingly com-
plex challenge given that in a globalizing and diversifying world the number of stakeholders
across scales and sectors that need to be involved in risk reduction is rising in most places.
Against this increased complexity, a clear division of responsibilities but also the rules for the
collaboration among the state actors and other actors of the civil society and the business
sector is needed in order to pursue an integrative disaster management that pools the resour-
ces of all affected actors but also their specific responsibilities (Williams, 2011).
State authorities in developed countries are typically considered capable of fulfilling their
responsibility for risk reduction, e.g. through maintaining adequate flood protection infra-
structure, providing effective planning guidance or enabling and facilitating insurance
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regimes in response to environmental hazards. However, research suggests that the picture
in many developing countries and emerging economies looks different. While many of these
countries have implemented laws and regulation on disaster risk management or, more
recently, climate change adaptation at the national level, the implementation and effective-
ness of respective policies, plans and regulations are often poor (e.g. Birkmann et al., 2014;
IFRC and UNDP, 2014).
The reasons behind this insufficient provision and effectiveness of state-led risk reduction
in developing countries and emerging economies can be manifold. First, many of these
countries experience a high population growth, rising urbanization and an impressive eco-
nomic growth. The rapid growth often surpasses the capacity of adequate infrastructure
development by the public sector (Garschagen and Romero-Lankao, 2015). Second, state
authorities in these countries often lack financial resources, technological capacities and
trained human capital even to establish standard infrastructure such as roads, housing,
electricity, education (Birkmann et al., 2014; Garschagen and Romero-Lankao, 2015).
Consequently, state authorities face difficulties in providing effective adaptation measures,
too, which typically require even more advanced technical skills and larger financial budgets.
Third, many of these countries are plagued by overall weak government effectiveness and
law enforcement, driven by issues such as crony-capitalism, corruption or exploitive rent-
seeking, rather than stringent checks-and-balances for securing decision-making in the inter-
est of the common good (Williams, 2011). Fourth, authorities in many countries or local
municipalities apparently have an incentive in downplaying environmental risks in order to
not jeopardizing investments and economic growth (Cutter et al., 2008). Lastly, conflicting
responsibilities of authorities often make it difficult to implement risk reduction measures
which will unfold their potential benefits across administrative constituencies and over
longer time frames – even though this challenge also appears to be very dominant in devel-
oped countries (Fuchs et al., 2011; Hallegatte, 2014).
These obstacles seriously compromise the overall capacity and effectiveness of state
action for successful risk reduction and adaptation in many developing countries and emerg-
ing economies. As a result, non-state actors are often left with having to bear the major
responsibility and costs for adapting themselves and the regions in which they interact and
pursue their economic activity. Firms play a particularly important role in this respect since
their competitiveness and survival directly hinge on the question of how well environmental
hazards, which potentially threaten their performance and economic success, can be mini-
mized through effective adaptation. As firms typically collocate in urban or rural areas, the
question further arises whether and how they think and reach beyond their individual
competitiveness and engage in collective action in the interest of regional adaptation –
both in response to the insufficient provision of state-led risk reduction and adapta-
tion measures.
In order to protect, for instance, their supply chain, critical infrastructure or the liveli-
hood of their employees firms might have interest in regional adaptation. These firms’
actions to implement large-scale adaptation will have direct or indirect impacts on the
regional development. Effective adaptation can strengthen the regional sustainability
through competitive firms that create, for instance, jobs, tax revenues and by a more
advanced infrastructure (e.g. transport ways, power supply) that is also beneficial during
times of no hazard events. However, also the opposite is possible. Insufficient adaptation or
the absence of any engagement on adaptation can lead to a socioeconomic downgrading
(e.g. bankruptcy of firms, abandoned settlements). How firms’ adaptation and their impact
on regional adaptation can be conceptualized is therefore of great relevance.
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Indonesian coastal cities’ exposure to floods –
The examples Jakarta and Semarang
Indonesia is a prime example for the aforementioned challenges. The country is exposed
to several environmental hazards (e.g. floods, earthquakes or forest fires). Especially,
the coastal areas face a huge amount of damages through environmental hazards since
the population and economic activities are concentrated here. At the same time,
Indonesia exemplifies that state authorities face difficulties to fulfill their responsibilities
on risk reduction and adaptation due to lacking financial budgets and weak government
effectiveness.
The disastrous Boxing Day Tsunami 2004 that devastated the northern part of Sumatra
and the earthquake in Yogyakarta 2006 can be seen as turning points reforming disaster
management policy. The Indonesian government improved their legislation on disaster risk
reduction particularly by the newly launched disaster management law No. 24/2007. Based
on this law, the National Agency of Disaster Management (BNPB) was established and the
provinces and regencies were encouraged to establish local disaster management agencies.
Inspired by the Hyogo Framework for Action, partnerships in disaster management were
strengthened legislatively. The law underpins inter alia the collaboration between the gov-
ernment, civil society and the private sector on disaster risk reduction (Izumi and Shaw,
2015). Although, Indonesia has achieved a considerable progress regarding disaster
management policy and the government implemented joint activities with international
organizations and NGOs to integrate the community, the business sector has mostly been
neglected (Djalante and Garschagen, 2017).
Taking a regional perspective, Jakarta and Semarang well illustrate that manufacturing
firms are heavily exposed to floods and that the state authorities are challenged to
provide adequate adaptation measures to floods for the entire city areas. Jakarta is primarily
facing pluvial and fluvial floods that affect the city several times a year. But, for instance, in
2007 and 2012 massive floods inundated more than half of the metropolis over weeks
and the social and business life was paralyzed for months (Peters et al., 2015). Semarang,
on the other, mainly experiences tidal floods several times per year. These flood
events are not perceived as shocks, but rather as belonging to the city’s regular
hydrology. In both cities, land subsidence, coastal erosion and the sea level rise add to
the flood hazard in both Jakarta and Semarang (Firman et al., 2011; Marfai and
King, 2007).
The manufacturing sector, which is of great economic importance in both cities, is par-
ticularly affected. Manufacturing firms are primarily concentrated in the northern coastal
parts of both cities. These are also the areas with the highest number of flood events.
Although this location yields economic benefits (e.g. easier transportation facilities), firms
suffer economic losses due to floods and coastal erosion (Hallegatte, 2014). Therefore, it is
interesting to understand how firms seek to overcome this dilemma, weigh the economic
benefits and losses of their location and engage in adaptation solutions to maintain or even
enhance their competitiveness despite the flooding conditions in their locations.
In order to understand whether and how manufacturing firms engage in adaptation and
which role state authorities have in supporting adaptation processes, we conducted an
explorative field study in both cities. Between 2015 and 2017, we interviewed 67 affected
manufacturing firms, five scientific experts, four representatives from NGOs or community-
based adaptation initiatives and eight political decision-makers.
Manufacturing firms in both cities were found to engage in adaptation but primarily rely
on individual adaptation measures. These include, most prominently the elevation of streets
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or plant facilities as well as the installation of pumping capacities. In doing so, most firms
established procedures of response, but often intensify them progressively, e.g. pumping
capacities. In Jakarta, however, the massive losses in the 2007 and 2012 floods pushed
firms to modify their adaptation and find novel solutions to continue their businesses
even during floods. For instance, medium-sized and large-scale firms established emergency
response teams and changed their production procedures, e.g. increasing their storage facil-
ities. In contrast, such initiatives were hard to find in Semarang. Most of the firms rely on
long-established adaptation measures (e.g. pumps). Substantial risk mitigation strategies
against the increasing tidal flooding and coastal erosion are mostly not undertaken.
Apparently, the firms in Semarang are unable to break their (mal)adaptation trajectories.
The data suggest that this is due the firms’ comparatively low competitiveness and thus,
limited financial resources for more progressive adaptation.
With regard to collective adaptation, the picture in Jakarta is again different from that in
Semarang. Since the massive floods in 2007 and 2012, Jakarta’s city authority with the
support of the World Bank and the Japan International Cooperation Agency undertook
river normalization, uplifting of streets and the relocation of river bank settlements primar-
ily in commercial and residential areas of the central business district. In addition, large-
scale domestic and multinational firms in the northeastern district Cakung financed and
executed flood risk reduction measures – a more sophisticated pumping system and a drain-
age canal. The initiative emerged from a multinational firm that realized that its individual
onsite adaptation measures such as pump systems and elevation of plant facilities were not
protecting the production sufficiently. Together with nearby firms, possible solutions were
reviewed and the nearby residents were included into the final decision-making. However,
the implementation was delayed for years by lacking permission of the city authorities. It
was implemented just recently.
In the second largest industrial site in the Northwest of Jakarta where medium-sized
domestic firms are dominant, however, no engagement in collective adaptation could be
observed. These firms rather rely on individual adaptation efforts or just try to survive
under the hazard-prone conditions. Due to limited capabilities many firms rather pursue
a ‘wait-and-see’ strategy. There is no collaboration between the firms and other stakeholder.
Also the city authorities do not have plans to implement larger pump systems or normalize
the river. The interview data suggest two key reasons. First, the city budget constraints
investments into large-scale adaptation measures. Second, the city plans to convert the most
of the industrial area into residential and commercial areas. Consequently, manufacturing
firms that are interested in collective adaptation receive no governmental support.
In Semarang, low engagement with collective adaptation was found. This is a remarkable
situation since the impacts of floods and coastal erosion can be hardly tackled by individual,
small-scale adaptation. In the case of Genuk, the largest concentration of manufacturing
firms and most exposed area to floods, land subsidence and coastal erosion in Semarang, the
city authorities do not feel responsible because the site is privately owned. However, the
industrial estate management is perceived as unreliable and ignorant by the tenants.
Consequently, firms, with sufficient financial resources, jointly elevated the access roads
to their plants. However, this small-scaled collective adaptation is an exception and was
undertaken by a few neighboring firms (less than five firms). Furthermore, it is questionable
whether this adaptation is comprehensive enough to protect the industrial site in the long
run. More systemic collective action by all firms, industrial estate management and the city
authorities that improves the conditions at large could not be observed. Firms mostly act on
their own and try to find solutions to tackle their individual exposure to floods.
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These both examples indicate the need of manufacturing firms for adaptation, both
individually and collectively. In terms of individual adaptation, the case studies show that
many firms are trapped in their trajectories of (mal)adaptation and particularly in Semarang
face difficulties to respond to the increasing exposure to environmental hazards by breaking
through their routines (i.e. firms’ specific structures and actions). As the case of Jakarta has
shown extreme flood events can be triggers for firms to adjust their strategies on (mal)
adaptation. On the contrary, the slowly deteriorating situation in Semarang barely changed
firms’ (mal)adaptation strategies.
In sum, not all the firms are adapting to environmental risks thus changing their orga-
nizational routines. This means that in order to understand firms’ unwillingness or incapac-
ity to adapt, a better understanding of their decision-making is needed. The case studies also
revealed that collaboration between state authorities, civil society and among firms is often
lacking, despite the fact that it would be needed for adapting more effectively. Since state
authorities are overstrained to provide adequate large-scale adaptation more engagement,
for instance, by firms is needed. However, our explorative case studies indicate that the
willingness to act collectively is limited. Firms’ engagement to collective adaptation is typ-
ically not facilitated by governmental support. At the same time, the firms are mostly
reluctant to overcome their immediate self-interest for protecting their business against
exposure to environmental hazards. Especially in Semarang, the willingness to engage in
collective adaptation is limited. Hence, it is necessary to analyze how collective adaptation
might take place and under which circumstances actors are willing to join collective action.
Along the same line, it is then also important to ask how individual and collective adapta-
tion will impact regional development.
Even though several scientific disciplines are interested in how firms adapt to changes,
take decisions in the context of uncertainty and engage in collective action, a comprehensive
framework on how firms can drive adaptation to environmental hazards is still missing. Our
framework aims to understand the situations in Jakarta and Semarang, which resemble
similar contexts in developing countries and emerging economies.
The integrative adaptive regional development (IARD) framework
The IARD framework is proposed here as a basis for the analysis on how and under
which conditions firms engage in individual or collective adaptation, and by doing so con-
tribute to integrative adaptive regional development (cf. Figure 1). Integrative adaptation
means here the ability of firms, together with other actor groups, to utilize and/or increase
their capacities to respond to change of economic, social, and ecological conditions in
order to reduce the exposure to environmental hazards, individually and collectively.
Adaptation is seen as an iterative path-dependent process that is shaped by the risk antic-
ipation and decision-making of the respective actor (Adger et al., 2005; Gallopın 2006;
Grothmann and Patt, 2005). However, avoiding individual or collective adaptation and
engaging in failed or even counter-effective maladaptation is seen here to possibly lead to
an increase in the firms’ and regions’ risk profile (Barnett and O’Neill, 2010; Grothmann and
Patt, 2005).
Whether and how firms drive adaptation efforts should be seen from two perspectives.
First, firms need to adapt individually to environmental hazards in order to enhance their
competitiveness. Research by organizational studies and evolutionary economic geography
has pointed out that firms’ strive to enhance competitiveness through continuous adaptation
of their organizational routines (i.e. firms’ specific structures and actions). Improving
routines enable firms to respond to changing market or environmental conditions
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(Frenken and Boschma, 2007; Nelson and Winter, 1982). The outcome of individual adap-
tation will primarily affect the firms’ own competitiveness, but the outcomes can positively
alter other firms and stakeholders who imitate these effective activities. Additionally, indi-
vidual adaptation can have positive but also negative side-effects for other actors. For
instance, an emergency pump can on the one hand help to decrease the inundation for
the surrounding firms or residential areas. On the other hand, the disposal of the pumped
water might inundate other areas and affect firms and residential areas. Furthermore, if
firms can compete well on the market, they will have positive effects on employment, tax
revenues, etc. On the other side, individual maladaptation will contribute to risk and
decrease the competitiveness (worst-case scenario: bankruptcy). This eventually contributes
negatively to wider socio-economic effects (e.g. employment, tax revenues).
Second, firms can be important players for collective adaptation in regional governance
systems, together with other stakeholders, such as other firms, the community, government
agencies, civil society organizations, and international development organizations.
Collective adaptation is characterized as collaborative activities that firms are initiating or
within which they are participating together with these other stakeholders. The goal of these
activities is to implement adaptation measures which cover broader areas, for instance entire
neighborhoods. Striving for collective adaptation requires that the members of the gover-
nance system minimize their pure self-interest by negotiation and punishing free-riding
(Ostrom, 2000). Engagement on collective adaptation is not cost-neutral for firms. But in
many contexts joint adaptation measures will be more effective than individual ones. For
instance, each individual firm will benefit from widening rivers or implementing a polder
system on the base of cost sharing. Individual firms can hardly finance and legitimize such
large-scale adaptation measures on their own. The outcome of collective adaptation is
particularly necessary to tackle large-scale risk-causing factors such as coastal erosion,
land subsidence, and clogged rivers.
Figure 1. IARD framework (own illustration).
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Therefore, we assume that firms’ engagement on adaptation together with other stake-
holders and by the legitimization of state authorities can shape different regional trajecto-
ries. In line with Solecki et al. (2017), the outcomes of integrative adaptive regional
development can have diverse forms ranging from resistance to resilience and transforma-
tion or collapse as an unintended effect of inaction, or the incapacity of effective (joint)
adaptation action. Resistance means that actors try to keep the current system and its
configurations (e.g. power relations) stable, despite increasing external stress such as the
rise in the frequency and intensity of flooding. It implies rising input resources, for instance,
protecting the infrastructure and strengthening rigid institutional or bio-physical structures.
Resistance often involves conventional engineered solutions with a focus on the built infra-
structure, e.g. coastal defense systems. On the individual firms’ perspective resistance can be
for instance the intensification of already existing options such as emergency pumps or back-
up generators.
Resilience implies slight adjustments of the current regional trajectory to improve the
ability to deal with external stress and crisis situations. However, the main regional con-
figuration is typically not being questioned. Resilience can rather be understood as an
‘adjustment at the margins’, which ultimately has the aim of stabilizing the core fabric of
the existing regional system in the face of potential external disturbance. The danger is
that these minor changes hamper or delay essential major ones. Therefore, the resilience
paradigm can in effect work against the need for more fundamental changes (Handmer
and Dovers, 1996; Holling and Gunderson, 2002). Examples for resilience can be
individually the adjustment of supply chains (e.g. in terms of emergency contingencies
for just-in-time systems). Collective adaptation of resilience can be the upgrading of
existing protection systems (e.g. for improved dykes infrastructures) or the modernization
in early warning systems (e.g. through online solutions).
In contrast, transformation is viewed as a form of adaptation that fundamentally ques-
tions the set-up and fit of a current regional system, its risk mitigation strategies and adap-
tation patterns (Pelling, 2011). The underlying threats of hazardous events are more likely to
be addressed directly. The aim of transformative adaptation is therefore to initiate a new
regional trajectory, i.e. applying novel routines that increase the regional long-term sustain-
ability by minimizing risks or rigidity traps and collapse, and by establishing co-benefits
from new development trajectories. This outcome requires a more risk-prone attitude, flex-
ibility, and a willingness to change behavior and institutional setting (Pelling, 2011). The
transformative process can be painful and not beneficial for every actor within the gover-
nance system. In addition, the risk of maladaptation is higher compared to the resistance or
resilience trajectory, but the potential long-term benefits of successful effective transforma-
tion can be significant. Flexibility and high adaptive capacities can reduce the risk of neg-
ative consequences (Handmer and Dovers, 1996; Nelson et al., 2007). A typical example for
individual adaptation can be the relocation of production facilities. A collective adaptation
can be the regional shift in economic activity from one sector to another (e.g. from
manufacturing into services).
Collapse constitutes the most severe outcome, occurring if no adaptation or maladapta-
tion is undertaken. In such a situation, the whole regional configuration can be locked-in
and incapable of adapting effectively. Reasons of a collapse can include the failure of state
authorities to engage in countermeasures against environmental hazards or firms pursuing a
‘wait-and-see’-strategy (Solecki et al., 2017). Consequently, the regional economic conse-
quences might be the exodus or bankruptcy of firms, which would lead to socioeconomic
downgrading in the entire region.
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In order to better understand which factors influence the described outcomes, we discuss
determinants for individual and collective adaptation in the two following sections.
Firms’ need and willingness to adapt to environmental hazards
The case studies of Jakarta and Semarang have shown that firms are exposed to environ-
mental hazards and their individual adaptation is mostly shaped by long-established solu-
tions, such as pump systems. The field study also revealed that the firms need to break
through their routines since the exposure to environmental hazards is increasing and cannot
fully covered by the existing routines. The interviews showed that firms, however, face
difficulties to modify their adaptation due to limited resources or constraints of the business
environment (e.g. increasing competition). Accordingly, it is necessary to understand how
firms utilize their skills, technologies, and resources in order to adapt to environmental
hazards. Moreover, it is important to understand how firms can incorporate effort on
adaptation in respect to their typical business strategies for enhancing their competitiveness.
Since decades, particularly organizational studies stress that routines are crucial for firms
to establish decision-making procedures and internal capabilities to respond effectively to
economic, social, and environmental changes. Generally, routines are firms’ specific struc-
tures and actions which shape future behavior and decision-making. Routines incorporate
stability and change and are adapted if firms experience new situations or common decision-
making fails (Berkhout et al., 2006; Nelson and Winter, 1982). They are derived from former
routines (e.g. experience, skills or tacit knowledge) and are determined by the institutional
landscape (Frenken and Boschma, 2007). The firms’ capability to replicate or adjust its
routines when market and environment conditions change, enable firms to enhance their
competitiveness (Frenken and Boschma, 2007; Nelson and Winter, 1982).
Until now, research on adaptation to risks and environmental hazards – particularly on
communities and households – typically stress the term ‘adaptive capacity’ which can be
interpreted as organizational routine. With regard to firms, the concept of adaptive capac-
ities provides an important emphasis on the endowment of resources and capabilities that
firms hold in order to adjust or utilize their routines. In particular, the limitation of adaptive
capacities and the false judgment of one’s own adaptive capacities should be taken into
account to understand firms’ individual adaptation. It might explain why firms rely on their
established routines because they will lean on existing competencies and are unlikely to
generate new knowledge in view of an evolving and uncertain landscape, so their compe-
tencies become inflexible (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Leonard-Barton, 1992). Also, false
judgment particularly during times of considerable uncertainty can lead to ineffective adap-
tation or maladaptation (Grothmann and Patt, 2005). For instance, production or storage
redundancies in order to respond more flexible during shock events tie up resources that can
be a financial or organizational burden during time of no shocks. This burden can limit
resources for innovating new products and services. Trade-off of distributing resources is
accelerated by the uncertainty when shocks will occur.
Decision-making in the context of risk
As we have seen in our interviewed firms, the impact of environmental hazards is relatively
uncertain and the firms sometimes hesitated to invest in more sophisticated adaptation
because the current losses by floods and coastal erosion can still be covered. This low
engagement on adaptation raises concerns on how firms can still survive in view of the
increasing long-term exposure, for instance, to floods. Apparently, the firms’ risk behavior
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play a crucial role on their engagement on individual adaptation. Some firms might be also
paralyzed by the environmental hazards since their low competitiveness does not enable
more investment on adaptation. Accordingly, it is important to understand how firms see
environmental hazards as a threat for their viability. Environmental hazards oftentimes
occur irregularly and their impact on firms’ competitiveness will just happen gradually.
This means firms face a great uncertainty to what extent they should adapt to them –
and when.
Behavioral economics provide several theorems of cognitive biases that determine the
rationally bounded risk behavior of decision-makers. Given the huge amount of different
explanatory factors that have been detected by behavioral economics and the limited scope
within this paper, we focus on one of the most seminal theorems. Most of the current
empirical evidence by behavioral economics on decision-making in the context of risk
refers to the prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979). The most seminal contri-
bution of the prospect theory is the loss aversion theorem. It explains that decision-makers
tend to take less risky decisions (i.e. taking no efforts on adaptation) if they still see a gain as
an outcome of their decision and vice versa. With regard to environmental hazards, for
instance, Page et al. (2014) showed by a natural experiment after the 2011 Australian floods
that homeowners in Brisbane who were directly affected were willing to accept more risky
gambles than unaffected ones. Accordingly, it can be assumed that firms are more willing to
adapt if the firms face considerable losses by environmental hazards. In contrast to the
prospect theory, however, the risk-sensitivity theory argues that decisions are mostly
made in response to need. Decision-makers prefer high-risk options in situations of great
need, because safe, low-risk options are unlikely to fulfill the needs. Accordingly, decision-
makers aim rather to minimize the probability of inappropriate outcomes in response to
their needs than to maximize certain outcomes (Mishra, 2014; Rode et al., 1999). These
equivocal assumptions and the missing research on how environmental hazards determine
firms’ decision-making on adaptation underpin the need to understand the impact of envi-
ronmental hazards on firms. Therefore, it is necessary to assess which magnitude or scope of
environmental hazards, and their respective losses, might push firms to engage in adaptation
or intensify their adaptation effort. The overall question should be to understand the careful
weighing of firms whether and which scope of adaptation is needed and how firms’ decision-
maker are perceiving environmental hazards as a substantial business risk.
As a consequence of this research gap, it is unclear to foresee whether and which adap-
tation measures will be implemented by the firms. In principle, firms have manifold options
that range from hard (e.g. capital-intensive, technologically based) to soft (e.g. organiza-
tional) adaptation measures. The choice of the most effective option depends on many
factors (e.g. type of hazards, affected asset, routines) and can create many trade-offs (e.g.
persistent vs. flexible measure) that firms need to consider (Linnenluecke and Griffiths, 2015;
Neise et al., 2017; Weinhofer and Busch, 2013). One of the most drastic adaptations is the
partial or even complete relocation of businesses. Especially, when the exposure is strongly
influenced by the location of the business, e.g. located in a low-lying coastal areas, relocation
might be considered an appropriate adaptation option (see examples in Linnenluecke et al.,
2011). If relocation is seen as too risky or costly, hard in-situ adaptation that focuses on the
infrastructure such as investments on protection measures like elevating the plant or rein-
forcing the building presents an option. Furthermore, the organization of production pro-
cesses can be modified, e.g. through changes in production capacity, storages or supply
chains. A distinctive soft adaptation that addresses the business organization can be the
introduction of a business continuity management which incorporates emergency response
teams, back-up plans, and redundancies (Linnenluecke and Griffiths, 2015).
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Moreover, the firms’ engagement in individual adaptation measures might differ based on
their size (SMEs vs. large firms) and national origin (domestic vs. multinational). For
instance, Haraguchi and Lall (2015) have revealed that due to the flood in Thailand the
multinational firm Toshiba rather relocated to the Philippines than adapt locally to the flood
exposure and investing in onsite protection. In contrast, domestic SMEs are less mobile due
to their local and social embeddedness within the community and more experienced with
past hazard events (Shaw and Izumi, 2015).
In sum, a better understanding of the firms’ rationales, enablers and barriers of adapta-
tion and their role for choosing between different types of adaptation still needs to
be examined.
Regions’ need to adapt to environmental hazards
The field study has also shown that firms often cannot handle the exposure to environmental
hazards on their own. The impact of coastal erosion, land subsidence, or floods affects entire
city areas. Hence, adaptation to environmental hazards has to be addressed at least on a
regional level, too. In the context of this paper, regions are understood as spatial entities
below the level of nation-states which are bound together by a common physical geography,
economic system, cultural identity, or political administration. Such regions are important
entities for adaptation since besides similar hazard profiles they are strongly integrated
economically and provide the basis for pooled adaptation funding.
As outlined above, risk reduction and adaptation to environmental hazards are typically
the responsibility of the state. However, the Indonesian state authorities – like in many
developing and emerging economies – are overstrained to provide adequate risk reduction
and adaptation measures. Therefore, the question occurs how affected actor groups, such as
firms, might provide or endorse collective engagement on adaptation with governmental
support at the regional level.
Firms of a region typically have a shared interest in the economic viability and adaptation
of their joint region. However, whether and how this interest also translates into effective
collaboration for collective adaptation among the firms with governmental support – and
with other actors in the society – often remains unclear. Institutional approaches and
governance concepts provide valuable analytical and normative perspectives to guide such
an analysis.
Adaptation governance systems and the power of institutions
Several case studies about the successful development and adaptation of regions have shown
that regional institutions are important explanatory factors (e.g. Grabher, 1993; Meyer and
Revilla Diez, 2015). Institutions, as place-specific endowments or shared features, create the
conditions to adapt more effectively. For instance, trust between regional economic actors
can be strengthened, which in turn reduces transaction costs and uncertainty (North, 1994).
Recent studies on the Pearl River Delta and the integration of Hong Kong with its hinter-
land, highlight the importance of informal arrangements between actors along the electron-
ics value chain, enabling firms to respond flexibly to market changes (Meyer and Revilla
Diez, 2015; Revilla-Diez et al., 2008). We assume that informal institutions are also impor-
tant for the realization of adaptation measures because of the insufficient role of the state.
Therefore, informal institutions can compensate the lack of state agency. Under these
circumstances, engagement on adaptation – particularly collective adaptation – requires
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trust and reliability among the stakeholders and a functioning governance system (e.g. Neise
et al., 2017).
Lately, many scholars stress the importance of a risk governance in order to adapt more
effectively to environmental hazards and to include a wide range of affected actor groups
(e.g. Folke et al., 2005; Lebel et al., 2006). Governance, as the arrangements and procedures
within a formal and informal institutional landscape, can be seen as the action field where
actors exercise their influence, mediate their interests, negotiate their responsibilities, and
organize their common affairs at the interface of the state, the private sector and the society
(Dente et al., 2005; Garschagen, 2014; Garschagen and Kraas, 2011; Lebel et al., 2006;
Pelling, 2011). In terms of collective adaptation to environmental hazards, governance
systems are assumed to create the institutional structures and policy processes that guide
and limit collective actions (Renn and Klinke, 2013). Moreover, collective adaptation
should not only comprise adjustments in the bio-physical environment (e.g. by means of
dykes or resettlement programs), but also needs to incorporate adjustments in the very
institutions of risk management and adaptation governance, such as planning mechanisms
and legal frameworks (Birkmann et al., 2010; Djalante et al., 2011).
Research focusing explicitly on the impact of different types of governance of adaptation
is only slowly emerging and is often characterized by normative requests rather than by
analytic precision. One of the first seminal insights is provided by Lebel et al. (2006) who
argue that deliberation, diverse participation, and open communication are useful factors to
foster trust, mutual understanding, and self-organization. Garschagen (2014) showed for the
case of Vietnam’s political transformation how state and non-state actors negotiate their
different interests, rights, and responsibilities with regard to risk reduction. More generally,
developing countries and emerging economies are particularly relevant cases for studying
risk governance since the relationship between the state, the private sector, and society in
their joint attempt to reduce risk and adapt to environmental hazards is changing dynam-
ically in these settings (Garschagen, 2014).
Firm’s willingness to collective adaptation and potential
regional outcomes
Nevertheless, taking a governance perspective also allows to reveal potential rifts and trade-
offs when negotiating collective adaptation. In particular, the effectiveness of adaptation is
determined by the willingness of stakeholders to engage in adaptation and perhaps even to
change institutions. The field study in Semarang indicated that the willingness of coordi-
nated collective adaptation is lacking. Firms mostly concentrate on individual solutions in
order to protect their business. The industrial estate managers show no interest in large-scale
adaptation and the state authorities do not feel responsible and are overstrained by the
huge complexity of land subsidence, coastal erosion and floods that affects the entire
city’s coastline.
Large-scale adaptation measures, such as constructing a dyke, will change the regional
environment for the stakeholders in different ways. It might even have negative effects for
some of the stakeholders: For instance, some fishermen may lose their livelihoods when a
dyke is constructed. Moreover, the participation of many actors may increase the complex-
ity of decision-making (Nelson et al., 2007), which makes flexible, rapid responses difficult.
There is a danger that initiatives pushed forward by the actors of a governance system may
not have full societal legitimization or that they may undermine democratic systems,
if powerful actors shape the regional economic systems solely to their own benefit.
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Thus, political legitimacy, i.e. effective institutional processes, cost-efficient handling of
public resources, and consideration of public preferences, has to be incorporated into effec-
tive governance systems in order to achieve collective adaptation (Renn and Klinke, 2013).
In this context, the role of the state in supporting collective adaptation appears to be
crucial. Although state authorities lack on providing large-scale adaptation due to their
limited technical skills and financial budgets they still exercise the authority (e.g. through
the formulation of laws and regulations) to allow large-scale adaptation measures (e.g.
dykes). Hence, firms’ initiated collective adaptation needs formal, indirect governmental
support, even though state authorities will not be actively involved in the implementation
of the adaptation measures. The firms’ initiated collective adaptation in Cakung, Jakarta,
showed clearly that the governmental support is strongly needed if firms attempt to shoulder
the responsibility of implementing large-scale adaptation measures that typically is the
responsibility of the state. Such adaptation measures become a common good so that an
entire neighborhood will benefit from a lower flood risk. However, the field study also
detected that a strong engagement on collective action in order to implement joint large-
scale adaptation is missing at large.
Research on social dilemmas and common goods has provided important insights in
understanding the processes – and barriers – that shape collective action. Most prominently,
this includes the seminal work of Ostrom (e.g. 1990) and the extensive empirical work of
Agrawal et al. (2013), Cardenas (e.g. 2004) and Janssen (e.g. 2015) about cooperative behav-
ior and the distribution of common goods. The respective research stresses the importance
of understanding the underlying decision-making and actions of the actors in order to
examine why the actors are willing to cooperate. Furthermore, the empirical research under-
pins that effective institutions such as rule compliance, sanction mechanisms, the constel-
lation of the governance systems (e.g. size of actor groups, equivalent cost-benefits for all
actors) are crucial points for collective actions (Janssen, 2015; Ostrom, 2011).
How can firms be active players on collective adaptation within a governance system, e.g.
in our case study Semarang? Firms as stakeholders of a governance system can act as
“institutional entrepreneur”. According to DiMaggio (1988), these actors intend to
change established institutional arrangements and seek to set up new or at least modify
existing arrangements according to their interests (DiMaggio, 1988; Garud and Karnøe,
2001). Firms as institutional entrepreneurs possess the ability to initiate institutional change
proactively in order to achieve better adaptation outcomes. They take leadership to imple-
ment change, and while, they are not necessarily politically legitimized, their position
in formal and informal leadership systems, and their involvement in activities give them
support and de-facto legitimacy (Magis, 2010).
Hence, we suggest that firms might first have a pure business interest in implementing
broader adaptation jointly with other stakeholders and second, these efforts can enhance
their infrastructure and support the livelihood of their affected employees. For instance,
small- and medium-sized domestic firms are often the main drivers of local socioeconomic
welfare in many hazard-prone countries (Pauw, 2015). Therefore, we argue that they
also might have the societal legitimacy and interest to initiate collective adaptation as an
institutional entrepreneur.
However, as pointed out by research about collective action, powerful individuals or
groups who are interested in maintaining the status quo can hamper initiatives on collective
adaptation or poor, ineffective outcomes can be developed. The variety of different interests
within the governance system can endanger effective collective adaptation if no agreement
on the strategy is reached. It is crucial that the actors in the governance system are willing to
overcome their pure self-interest. In governance systems, the involvement of all the
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stakeholders concerned may succeed in preventing uncooperative behavior. However, dis-
tinct self-interest and power relations make it highly challenging to bring about a smooth,
effective collective adaptation. Therefore, enforced rules (e.g. sanction mechanisms) might
be realized to limit or punish individually deviant behavior (Ostrom, 2000).
These difficulties show that IARD typically calls for changes or modifications in prevail-
ing behavior and strategies. In particular, more self-interested behavior that firms might
seek will hinder collective adaptation. By doing this and also by rearranging firms’ own
routines, it might become more probable that firms act as institutional entrepreneurs and/or
an active players in a governance system. However, the willingness in changing behavior and
strategies might occur gradually and can be hampered by the ‘competency trap’ (Levitt and
March, 1988).
In consequence, individual and collective adaptation efforts might impact regional devel-
opment trajectories as described in our IARD-framework. The following scenarios illustrate
how regional trajectories could evolve based on our explorative field study in Indonesia:
In Jakarta, signs that the regional trajectory might change from resistance to resilience
and partially to transformation can be assumed. Formerly, Jakarta was trapped in a resis-
tance phase and near to a collapse. Firms mostly relied on long-term established routines,
such as pump systems and just expanded their capacity to respond to an increasing magni-
tude of floods. After the flood events in 2007 and 2012, however, many firms adjusted or
intensified their existing, individual adaptation measures. Slight modifications were under-
taken in order to stabilize the business strategies. These firms’ actions can therefore be
understood as resilience building. Going beyond such adjustments, particularly medium-
sized and large-scale firms implemented novel routines on adaptation which indicate a more
transformative rethinking of risk management strategies (e.g. introducing novel emergency
response teams). Such measures indicate that firms’ individual adaptation is starting to
transform. Also the intensified engagement by the city authorities on large scale-scale adap-
tation measures (e.g. river normalization) and the partially increasing firms’ engagement on
collective adaptation indicate a transformative progress on adaptation to floods. However,
Jakarta’s regional trajectory still lacks a coordinated engagement by all actors that cover the
entire city region. Rather engagement to floods adaptation is guided uncoordinated through
different priorities of the actors (e.g. city authorities vs. manufacturing firms). Thus, in order
to achieve a full transformation of the regional trajectory in Jakarta the level of coordina-
tion has to be increased and novel ways of risk mitigation have to be sought. Furthermore,
firms’ initiatives on collective adaptation should be encouraged by state authorities and
firms’ solutions should be integrated into the cities’ formal flood risk mitigation strategies.
In Semarang, a change of the trajectory in the future can hardly be presumed. At the
moment, the firms are unable to break their organizational routines and rely on their long-
term established but insufficient individual adaptation measures. Furthermore, firms’ col-
lective adaptation is only poorly established, for instance, by the tenants in the largest
industrial site Genuk. Since the industrial estate managements are unwilling to improve
the poor conditions for the entire industrial parks, small groups of firms, for instance, jointly
elevated the access roads to their plants. The firms primarily focus on their own benefit, but
more effective large-scale collective adaptation (e.g. planting mangroves to prevent coastal
erosion) that can reduce the exposure for the entire region is not envisaged. Moreover, the
political will of Semarang’s city authority is also limited to improve the severe conditions of
ongoing coastal erosion, land subsidence, and increasing events of tidal flooding.
Consequently, one needs to assume that the regional trajectory in Semarang will remain
in a resistance stage close to a collapse in the mid-term future.
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Conclusions and outlook
The growing impacts from intensifying environmental hazards such as flooding, typhoons,
or sea level rise make adaptation essential. While a lot of attention over the recent years has
been given to the adaptation of private households or communities, the ways in which firms
act as drivers of adaptation are much less understood. This is striking, given that firms have
to shoulder the lion’s share of economic impacts from disasters and play a crucial role for
the well-being and resilience of entire regions. Developing countries and emerging econo-
mies are of particular concern in this context, given that environmental hazards are in these
countries coupled with other challenges such as rapid urbanization, low economic profit-
ability, and weak institutional capacities on the part of states and formal institutions.
Authorities in many of these countries face difficulties in providing sufficient adaptation,
leaving an adaptation vacuum which needs to be filled by firms and other actors. The
Indonesian coastal cities Jakarta and Semarang exemplify these challenges, most notably
for manufacturing firms. The firms primarily rely on individual adaptation by long-
established organizational routines. Collective adaptation can hardly be observed. Poor
established regional governance systems and low support by state authorities hamper
particularly engagement on collective adaptation.
Until now, little effort has been made to understand decision-making concerning adap-
tation at the firm level, including aspects such as strategic business decisions in the face of
(increasing) environmental hazards. While valuable insights can be drawn from different
theoretical and empirical streams of existing literature, a comprehensive framework with a
strong focus on the role of firms as stakeholders in regional adaptation has been still miss-
ing. Based on our explorative study in Jakarta and Semarang, the paper proposes a novel
conceptual framework on IARD. The objective of the framework is to provide conceptual
guidance for the analysis of regional adaptation processes, especially focusing on the role of
firms, and the debate and design of policy options to foster successful regional adaptation
trajectories. The framework argues that exposure to environmental hazards combined with
broader socioeconomic developments act as a trigger of institutional change. Firms, as
stakeholders within regional governance systems, and their decision-making under risk
and adaptation, are assumed to be a key factor. The concept suggests examining firms’
decision-making with regard to adaptation from two perspectives: First, firms enhance
their competitiveness through adaptation by relying on their routines, which are determined
by the decision-makers’ risk behavior and the institutional setting. Second, firms act as
stakeholders within wider collective adaptation activities together with other stakeholders
(regional governance system). Through both strands reconfigured, regional trajectories can
be initiated that can have different outcomes, ranging from collapse to resistance, resilience
or transformation.
While the presented framework provides a systematization based on existing literature
and allowed us to assume potential future regional trajectories on adaptation to floods in
Jakarta and Semarang, the implications of firm-driven adaptation processes should be fur-
ther addressed. Additional steps have to be taken to validate the usefulness of the frame-
work. Comparative case-studies might constitute a useful method. Qualitative approaches,
such as interviews with firms’ decision-makers and respective stakeholders as well as the
observation of decision-makers’ actions might be a promising way to assess adaptation.
Field experiments, including discrete choice scenarios, with firms’ decision-makers as par-
ticipants can capture the risk behavior and willingness to change regional trajectories. This
mixed-methods approach may facilitate a better understanding of adaptive responses and
wider socioeconomic development at the regional level in the face of environmental hazards.
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Overall, risk-related environmental hazards remain a pressing issue in many developing
countries and emerging economies. The success of socioeconomic transition will be deter-
mined by whether the countries are able to deal with environmental hazards, i.e. to reduce
the risks and to exploit the opportunities resulting from these hazards.
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